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Abstract 
Traditional coca uses have taken place in Peru and Bolivia for at least the past three thousand years. 
International organizations have been unsuccessful in urging the implementation of  zero-coca growing  
policies in those countries. Supply-side harm reduction strategies are currently being implemented in 
Bolivia, which rely on social control to limit, although not totally abolish, coca growing. In this article, 
the different motivations for coca growing for traditional uses are reviewed, and the data from a survey 
conducted with 496 farmers in an indigenous community are examined, to provide an overview of the coca-
growing problem and explore if social control could potentially influence the scale of coca growing in Peru. 
The results suggest that social control variables, such as attachment, involvement, and beliefs, limit the size 
of coca-growing areas. Those factors have been largely overlooked and may offer an opportunity to reduce 
coca areas if explicitly considered in drug-control policy design.
 eywords: coca, cocaine, traditional coca uses, supply-side harm reduction, drug-control policy, Peru.
Resumen
Los usos tradicionales de la coca han tenido lugar en Perú y Bolivia durante, al menos, los últimos tres 
mil años. Las organizaciones internacionales no han tenido éxito para instar la ejecución de las políticas 
de  cero crecimiento de coca  en esos países. Las estrategias de reducción de daños de la oferta, que se 
basan en el control social para limitar, aunque no abolir totalmente el cultivo de coca, están siendo imple-
mentadas actualmente en Bolivia. En este artículo, se revisan los usos tradicionales que motivan el cultivo 
de coca; y se analizan los datos de una encuesta realizada a 496 agricultores en una comunidad indígena 
para proporcionar una visión general del problema cocalero; y se explora si el control social podría, poten-
cialmente, influir en la escala del cultivo de coca en el Perú. Los resultados sugieren que las variables de 
control social, como el apego, la participación y las creencias limitan el tamaño de las áreas de cultivo de 
coca. Estos factores, en gran medida, han sido pasados     por alto y que pueden ofrecer una oportunidad 
para reducir las áreas de cultivo de coca si se consideran de manera explícita en el diseño de políticas de 
control de drogas.
Palabras clave: coca, cocaína, usos tradicionales de la coca, reducción de daños de la oferta, política de 
control de drogas, Perú.
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1 
Introduction
Coca ( rythro ylum coca) is a bush native to the Amazon rainforest, 
the leaves from which cocaine  an addictive alkaloid  is extracted. 
Coca leaves have been traditionally used for at least 3,000 years by 
indigenous South American populations (Rivera et al. 2005). Traditional 
uses include coca chewing as a stimulant to overcome fatigue, hunger 
and thirst; coca tea drinking to combat altitude sickness; and coca-leaf 
offerings  during  religious  ceremonies  (Rospigliosi  2004).  Moreover, 
indigenous people share and exchange coca leaves as a social expression 
of caring and respect (Allen 1981). Coca is therefore a facilitator of social 
cohesion and an important part of indigenous cultural heritage (Bolton 
1976, Instituto Indigenista Interamericano 1989).
However, since the 1970s coca has been largely grown in Colombia, 
Peru and Bolivia, as the raw material for cocaine extraction (Caulkins et 
al. 2005). Those three countries supply all the cocaine worldwide (UNODC 
2011). Until recently, Colombia was the major supplier of cocaine in the 
world. Following large scale eradication campaigns and farm-level price 
declines in Colombia, coca areas have decreased in that country, but 
have largely increased in Peru and Bolivia.1 Currently, Peru is the country 
with the total largest coca areas worldwide (41   of the world total), 
followed by Colombia (38  ) and Bolivia (21  ) (UNODC 2011).
In contrast to Colombia, where the number of traditional coca users 
is  about  100  thousand  (CLOC  2013),  in  Peru  and  Bolivia,  the  more 
extensive number of traditional coca users (estimated in 3.5 and 4 million, 
respectively; ibid.) further complicates the design and implementation of 
coca-growing control policies. International conventions compel those 
three countries to totally ban coca cultivation since 1961. Nevertheless, 
prohibitionist or  zero-coca  policies have not been fully implemented in 
Peru and Bolivia. It has been argued that the Peruvian government so far 
has not found it appropriate to risk the provocation of millions of traditional 
users and thousands of coca farmers by implementing zero-coca growing 
policies (Mayer 1993). Supporters of coca growing for traditional uses 
largely  employ  socially  oppressed  minority-oriented  arguments  with 
 elegant anti-imperialist shades , which are easily exploited politically 
(ibid.).
In Bolivia, supply-side harm reduction2 strategies have formally 
been  implemented  since  2009.  This  approach  reverses   decades  of 
U.S.,  financed  policies  focussed  almost  exclusively  on  military/police 
suppression and eradication that resulted in well-documented human 
rights violations and harassment of the peasant farmers who grow coca 
leaf, a central component of Andean indigenous culture  (Farthing and 
Kohl 2012: 489). Coca growing for traditional uses is also allowed by 
national laws and regulations. In contrast to Peru, where the traditional 
1	 This	is	a	persistent	side effect	
of	drug	control	policies	known	
as balloon effect:	coca	
reduction	in	one	area	is	offset	
by	increases	in	other	areas	(like	
a	balloon	that	when	it	is	
squee ed	in	one	area	increases	
its	volume	in	other	area).
2	 Supply side	harm	reduction	is	
a	relatively	new	concept,	and	
has	its	foundation	in	 demand 
side 	harm	reduction.	
 ( emand	side)	harm	reduction	
refers	to	policies,	programmes	
and	practices	that	aim	to	
reduce	the	harms	associated	
with	the	use	of	psychoactive	
drugs	in	people	unable	or	
unwilling	to	stop.	The	defining	
features	are	the	focus	on	the	
prevention	of	harm,	rather	than	
on	the	prevention	of	drug	use	
itself,	and	the	focus	on	people	
who	continue	to	use	drugs 	
( arm	Reduction	International	
2013).	Supply side	harm	
reduction	focuses	on	
prevention/	reduction	of	harms	
associated	with	coca	growing,	
rather	than	on	the	enforcement	
of	  ero	coca	growing 	
policies.	For	more	information	
about	the	supply side	harm	
reduction	as	a	concept	see	
 reenfield	and	Paoli	(2012)._ 1
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coca growing rights are provided to individual farmers; coca growing is 
permitted to farmers located in specific regions of Bolivia. Current supply-
side  harm  reduction  strategies  limit  the  individual-level  coca  growing 
areas to one cato (1600 m2 in the Chapare and 2500 m2 in the Yungas) by 
social control means. Coca production rights are given to the communities 
or local coca growers’ associations. If more than one cato of coca area is 
found  per  individual  farmer,  the  rights  are  taken  away  for  the  whole 
community or association. According to supporters of this policy, the 
establishment of a cato  a maximum individual-level coca production 
area ,  helps  to  guarantee  a  minimum  source  of  income  for  many 
impoverished  small-holder  farmers  (Farthing  and  Kohl  2012).  In  this 
context,  supply-side  harm  reduction  can  be  characterized  as  drug-
control policy that aims primarily to reduce the potential adverse socio-
economic consequences of the production coca.
Based on the fact that total illicit crop eradication seems to be an 
unrealistic aim, Trace (2012) argues that the application of broader and 
explicit supply-side harm reduction approaches is needed, especially in 
countries with long tradition of coca uses, such as Peru and Bolivia. 
According to Jelsma (2012), the acceptance of harm reduction programs 
has grown worldwide in the recent years. However, its effectiveness is 
still the subject of intense debate due to difficulties in selecting appropriate 
indicators and objectively measuring their outcomes (Farthing and Kohl 
2012). Another related problem is the lack of relevant data (EU 2009). In 
this article, the effects of social control in coca growing are evaluated to 
explore  their  possibilities  as  supply-side  harm  reduction  strategies  in 
Peru. To this end, I examine a unique data set that I collected from an 
indigenous community located in one coca growing region in Peru.
The objectives of this paper are: first, to provide a review of literature 
related to coca growing for traditional uses, including historic perspectives 
and alleged motivations for traditional coca use. This information helps 
us to understand why prohibitionist policies may never be successfully 
implemented in countries with extensive traditional coca uses (Peru and 
Bolivia). Secondly, to evaluate if supply-side harm reduction  a subject 
which is still under intense debate  could help to limit coca growing 
production using an indigenous community in Peru as case study. The 
paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the history of coca 
growing from pre-colonial time to present; section 3 describes the current 
incentives for traditional coca uses; section 4 indicates the national and 
international regulations applicable to coca growing and the available 
coca commercialization channels in Peru; section 5 presents the main 
types of drug-control policies and the assessment of their main effects in 
supply countries; section 6 examines the potentiality of social control as 
supply-side harm reduction strategies in Peru; and section 7 corresponds 
to the summary and conclusions. 2_
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2 
 istorical Evolution of Coca  ses
This section explains the evolution of coca cultivation from the pre-
colonial to the republican period. Traditional uses have occurred in all 
periods,  but  their  social  status  has  changed  along  those  periods.  In 
particular,  this  historical  background  is  relevant  because  the  dispute 
between proponents of  zero-coca growing  or prohibitionist policies, 
and supporters of the continuation of coca traditional uses is partially 
based on the interpretation of the historical records related to this crop.
2 1   Pre Colonial Period
Coca  bushes  are  naturally  distributed  from  Peru  and  Bolivia 
throughout the Eastern Andes from Ecuador south to Argentina (Plowman 
1981). The exact date of coca domestication is unknown. Hair and nail 
samples  from  mummies  indicate  that  coca  chewing  and/or  coca  tea 
drinking took place about 3,000 years ago (Rivera et al. 2005). Evolutionary 
studies of the pre-historic use of coca are difficult to conduct because 
remains  of  coca  are  rarely  uncovered  by  archaeologists  or  positively 
identified by botanists due to their fragile nature (Hastorf 1987). Thus, 
archaeological ceramic pieces are commonly used as a proof of the use 
of coca by pre-Columbian cultures. Those ceramic pieces give indications 
of coca’s possible social function: the  coquero  (person chewing coca) 
was always sitting on a ceremonial chair, supposed to be reserved for a 
chief,  a  priest  or   shaman   (witch-doctor).  On  some  ceramics  the 
 coquero  wears a necklace or a band across the torso which is symbol 
of  high  social  status  (Naranjo  1981)  indicating  coca  chewing  by  the 
nobility,  but  it  is  unknown  if  coca  use  was  common  throughout  the 
population during the pre-colonial period.
From the Incan period, there are historical reports of coca uses and 
functions  from  the  records  of  early  Spanish  conquerors.  Chronicler 
Huaman Poma reported that coca chewing was reserved for the noble 
and religious classes, and its use was forbidden for the majority of the 
population. Consequently, it is commonly believed that the Inca Empire 
restricted coca use to the nobility (Llorens 2004). On the other hand, 
Mayer (2004) interprets that common citizens had access to coca leaves 
through community chiefs as a state-mediated reward: coca leaves were 
given to any citizen as a quasi-divine present from the Inca emperor 
regardless  of  his  or  her  social  position.  The  Instituto  Indigenista 
Interamericano (1989) maintains that Incas used coca to compensate its 
army and allies. Therefore, support exists for the interpretation that coca 
chewing was not exclusively a privilege of the few.
Parkeson’s (1983) evaluation of early Spaniards’ chronicles related to 
the Inca land tenure system shows that individual farmers and communities 
were permitted to cultivate coca for their own uses, although he noted 
that this situation was not universal throughout Incan territory. Thus, there _ 3
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is no consensus about coca use among the common citizens of the Incan 
Empire. Even if it was allowed, it seems that access to coca leaves was 
restricted  during  that  period.  Historical  evidence  suggests  that  coca 
chewing  became  widespread  among  indigenous  people  in  Peru  and 
Bolivia during the colonial period.
2 2   Colonial Period
After the Spaniards seized most of the available gold, silver, and 
precious  stones,  they  began  the  exploitation  of  mines,  mainly  in  the 
Andes mountain range. Indigenous mine workers were provided daily 
portions  of  coca  leaves.  Coca  use  was  accepted  and  easily  spread 
among  the  mine  workers  and  the  indigenous  population  in  general, 
probably due to its status as the Inca’s elite crop. Spaniards reaped large 
economic benefits from this crop. Coca had an immediate exchange 
value for the Spaniards because it only grows in the (Upper) Amazon 
rainforest (Naranjo 1981, Llorens 2004).
Coca soon became the centre of a controversy, which endured in 
varying degrees of intensity for about a century. Religious missionaries 
began to oppose coca use as part of their efforts to dissociate indigenous 
people from any vestige of their pagan past due to the use of coca leaves 
in various rituals. Supporters of coca use had economic interests and 
argued that without coca, the indigenous population would rebel and 
refuse to work in the mines. There were great economic interests in both 
the mining and coca-leaf selling revenues; and the coca debate ended in 
failure for the opponents of the leaf (Gagliano 1963). Thus, the status of 
coca changed from elite usage in the pre-colonial period to common 
usage during the colonial period among the indigenous population. Coca 
chewing had a low social status connotation. Spaniards did not chew 
coca and many even found the habit disgusting (Llorens 2004).
The current position of supporters of  zero-coca growing  policies is 
partially based on the fact that coca chewing was apparently extended 
during the colonial period as a mean of intensifying the exploitation of 
indigenous people. If it is the case, they argue that it does not seem 
proper that traditional uses such as coca chewing should continue to be 
regarded as a constructive symbol of indigenous cultural identity.
2 3   Republican Period
The coca chewing habit and status did not change much during the 
Republican period, but during this period cocaine was first extracted 
from coca leaves. Nineteenth century foreign travelers reported on the 
medicinal powers of coca leaves, but coca did not become popular in 
Europe until cocaine was isolated by Niemann in G ttingen, Germany, 
in 1860 (Grinspoon and Bakalar 1981). Later, the discovery of cocaine’s 
analgesic  properties  by  Dr.  Carl  Koller  in  1884  led  to  world-wide 
recognition of coca leaves and their derivatives (Martin 1970). Coca leaf 
extract  and  cocaine  stimulant  properties  were  used  in  medicine  and  4_
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considered  a  panacea  for  a  large  variety  of  complaints.  They  were 
included in prescription drugs, patent medicines, wine (  in Mariani ), 
and a soda drink ( Coca Cola ). When the addictive properties became 
apparent,  cocaine  lost  its  status  within  one  or  two  generations.  So, 
cocaine went from high praise by kings, popes, and doctors as the most 
beneficial stimulant tonic to a vigorous condemnation as a dangerous, 
addictive narcotic. Cocaine was then legally banned, except for limited 
medicinal uses (Martin 1970, Grinspoon and Bakalar 1981).
According to Caulkins et al. (2005), the consumption of illegal drugs 
surged  during  the  1960s  and  1970s  in  US  when  the  popularity  of 
psychoactive drug use was stimulated by anti-establishment attitudes 
among young adults, some of whom faced the prospect of being drafted 
to fight an unpopular conflict in  ietnam. During this period, Mexico and 
Colombia were the main suppliers of marijuana to US. Between the 1980s 
and mid-1990s there was a shift in demand in US from marijuana towards 
cocaine and its derivatives. This caused a coca growing boom, first in 
countries with relatively large coca growing for traditional uses such as 
Peru and Bolivia, and later in Colombia (Dietz et al. 2001). At present, the 
value of the global cocaine market is estimated at around US 88 billion. 
The US is the largest consumer of cocaine with a US 37 billion market 
(UNODC 2010). In this country, illegal drugs are consumed by at least 16 
million people, representing 7   of the population over the age of 12 
(Caulkins et al. 2005). The second largest consumer of cocaine is the EU 
with a US 34 billion market (UNODC 2010).
3 
Current Incentives for Traditional Coca  ses
In  Peru,  traditional  coca  users  account  for  around  20    of  the 
population above the age of 12 years. They consume around 6,550 metric 
tons of dried coca leaves per year. Coca chewers and coca tea drinkers 
constitute 64   and 31   of the total traditional consumers, respectively. 
Other coca uses such as medicinal, religious, and divination account for 
the remaining 5   (Rospigliosi 2004) (See table 1).
Motivations for the traditional consumptive uses such as chewing 
coca  or  drinking  coca  tea  are  related  to  their  alleged  health  and 
physiological benefits such as: increased physical resistance and heat 
retention (Favier et al. 1996a, 1996b, 1997); appetite suppression and 
nutrition (Burchard 1992, Bedford et al. 1980, 1981a; Burczynski et al. 
1986,  ee et al. 1983, Duke et al. 1975, Castro and Zavaleta 2006, Garcia-
Giesmann 1950, Collazos et al. 1965, Ramos-Aliaga et al. 2004, Cordero 
2002); and altitude sickness alleviation (Hanna 1974, Favier et al. 1996a, 
Brutsaert et al. 1995)._  
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The concentration of cocaine in dried coca leaves is relatively low: 
from 0.13 to 0.86   (Holmstedt et al. 1977), and many research efforts 
have reported no evidence of euphoric effects or addictive symptoms 
based on traditional consumption methods (Hanna 1974, Bolton 1976, 
South 1977, Weil 1981). Converse to the potential health and physiological 
effects, the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano (1989: 21) claims that 
traditional  coca  consumption  is  not  related  to  the  satisfaction  of  a 
metabolic necessity, but with deep cultural considerations, and therefore 
the act of coca chewing has important cultural connotations for indigenous 
populations.
Coca facilitates social interaction and it is ubiquitous in ritual con-
texts (Bolton 1976). Coca is a  lubricant  in any social event; it is the 
central element in all ceremonies. The presence of coca is a symbol of 
great gratification. It is used to celebrate all the stages of the life cycle 
(birth, baptism, marriage, and death) and social events (ayni or reciprocal 
work, parties, trips, visits). Its use according to the established social 
etiquette embodies the Andean cultural character (Instituto Indigenista 
Interamericano 1989).
Indeed, the traditional handling, sharing, and consumption of coca 
leaves are governed by clearly defined rules of etiquette. As this etiquette 
is prescribed by indigenous cultural tradition, adherence to it implies the 
presentation of oneself as a participant in this tradition. The act of chewing 
coca  leaves  is  an  unequivocal  statement  of  cultural  loyalties.  Coca 
chewing identifies one as an indigenous person (Allen 1981). In Peru, 
where  social  stratification  and  upward  mobility  exist;  coca  chewing, 
indigenous ethnicity, and  uechua or Aymara mono-linguism are viewed 
as attributes of low social standing (Negrete 1978). According to Mayer 
(2004), given that chewing coca is a stigma, indigenous people use it in 
defiance  of  discrimination.  In  this  way,  they  recognize  the  solidarity 
among indigenous populations. Coca use is a symbol of cultural identity 
clearly showing who is indigenous.
The  opponents  of  zero-coca  growing  policies  argue  that  forced 
elimination of traditional use would constitute an attempt to undermine 
the basis of Andean cultures and solidarity of an oppressed social group 
Traditional use
Number
of people 
 g of coca
consumed  ilograms
per person
per year Total Percentage Total Percentage
Coca chewing 2019574 64.0 6362341 97.1 3.15
Coca tea   964776 30.6   165020   2.5 0.17
Other uses   169538   5.4   23654   0.4 0.14
  Older than 12 years.
Source: Rospigliosi (2004). Own elaboration.
Table 1
Main Traditional Coca Uses in Peru  _
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(Mayer 2004). For some traditional coca use advocates, prohibitionist 
policies would display a serious disregard for cultural values on par 
with  hypothetical  attempts  to  outlaw  beer  in  Germany,  coffee  in  the 
Middle East, or tea drinking in Japan (Martin 1970, Instituto Indigenista 
Interamericano 1989).
4 
International and Peruvian legislation  
and commerciali ation channels in Peru
4 1   International and Peruvian legislation
The international conventions on narcotic drugs ratified by Peru and 
the Peruvian national legislation are blurred and contradictory. In 1961, 
the United Nations (UN) Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs placed 
coca leaf as well as cocaine derivatives on Schedule I. Coca is therefore 
subject  to  the  highest  level  of  control.  The  member  states  of  the 
Convention, including Peru and Bolivia, prohibited inter alia the cultivation, 
processing, and consumption of coca for non-medicinal purposes. The 
Convention also states that  coca leaf chewing must be abolished within 
twenty-five years from the coming into force of this Convention .3 At the 
time when this Convention was elaborated, phasing out coca cultivation 
was  perceived  as  beneficial  to  traditional  consumers,  and  a  way  to 
eliminate or reduce the illicit production and trafficking of cocaine at the 
international level (INCB 2009).
In 1988, the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances specified that the measures adopted by 
each  government  to  prevent  illicit  cultivation  and  eradicate  coca 
production  should  respect  fundamental  human  rights  and  take  due 
account of traditional licit uses where there is historic evidence of such 
use. The Convention does not state what those traditional uses are, and 
it is open to innumerable interpretations (Thoumi 2004). However, Thoumi 
(2004: 302) suggests that the international conventions have implicitly 
accepted that indigenous communities have to be banned from traditional 
use for their own good.  Otherwise the 1988 Convention would have 
recognized explicitly that the 1961 Single Convention provision to ban 
coca chewing had been a mistake and that coca chewing is a legitimate 
coca use instead of having a vague reference to traditional uses .
In relation to the Peruvian national legislation, the General Drug Law 
of 1978 (Decree Law 22095) still constitutes the main instrument for drug-
control (Jones and Amler 1997). ENACO ( Empresa Nacional de la Coca  
or  National  Coca  Company),  a  state-owned  company  with  exclusive 
3	  evertheless,	Bolivia	indicated	
the	following	reservation	to	the	
1961	 onvention	(  	1975:	1):	
 The	Plurinational	State	of	
Bolivia	reserves	the	right	to	
allow	in	its	territory:	traditional	
coca	leaf	chewing 	the	
consumption	and	use	of	the	
coca	leaf	in	its	natural	state	for	
cultural	and	medicinal	
purposes,	such	as	its	use	in	
infusions 	and	also	the	
cultivation,	trade	and	
possession	of	the	coca	leaf	to	
the	extent	necessary	for	these	
licit	purposes .	In	2009,	Bolivia	
formulated	a	reservation	
requesting	that	the	articles	
referring	to	the	prohibition	of	
coca	growing	(for	traditional	
uses)	and	traditional	coca	use	
should	be	eliminated	from	the	
1961	 onvention 	otherwise,	
 large	part	of	Bolivia s	
population	could	be	considered	
criminals	and	punished	as	
such 	such	an	interpretation	is	
therefore	inapplicable 	(  	
Economic	and	Social	 ouncil	
2009:	5).	In	2011,	Bolivia	
presented	a	formal	notification	
of	denunciation	of	1961	
 onvention	to	the	  .	Bolivia	
indicated	it	will	then	accede	to	
the	 onvention	again	with	a	
reservation	on	the	coca	leaf	
and	its	traditional	uses._ 7
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rights to the commercialization of coca for traditional uses and cocaine 
for the small legal market of medical and scientific uses, was created 
under the scope of this law. This law indicates that coca could only be 
supplied  to  ENACO  by  farmers  registered  in  the  General  Register  of 
Coca-Leaf Producers (Padrón General de Productores de Hoja de Coca), 
and prohibited the cultivation of coca and seedlings in new areas within 
the national territory. This reference to  cultivation  includes the grafting 
and renovation of existing coca bushes. Therefore, the spirit of the law 
was to ban coca cultivation in the medium or long term. In that year, 
22,925 coca farmers were included in the General Register of Coca-Leaf 
Producers, and a total of 25,159 licences were delivered to those farmers, 
one per agricultural plot. At present there are 31,886 registered coca 
farmers as the General Register of Coca-Leaf Producers was extended 
during 1988-1989. The law does not specify if the rights to sell coca 
belonged to the farmers or to their corresponding agricultural plots at the 
time they registered. In practice, the latter case was assumed as valid, 
and coca growing rights have been subsequently transferred or inherited, 
along with the agricultural plots, to the family members of those originally 
registered farmers (Glave and Rosemberg 2005).
Currently, coca growers non-registered in ENACO supply most of the 
coca cultivated in Peru (about 91   of the total coca production, see 
figure 1). The legislation articles that stated the specific punishments for 
farmers  who  cultivate  coca  (e.  g.,  time  in  prison  and  similar)  were 
derogated from the Criminal Code in 1991. In order to understand this 
fact, it is important to recognize the social context during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. The US, the major drug-control donor, had a strictly 
military approach to the coca growing problem. In Peru, however, the 
primary focus was upon  pacifying  the country and bringing the violence 
of terrorist groups under control. Shining Path, the largest terrorist group 
in the country, moved into the coca producing region of Huallaga in 1984 
and found that farmers considered the police and government officials as 
enemies engaged in trying to destroy their coca fields. It was an easy 
task for Shining Path to find allies among the coca farmers. Despite the 
fact that Shining Path financed itself through narcotic-related activities, 
the  government  perceived  that  it  was  more  important  not  to  pursue 
policies that would increase support for the terrorist group in that huge 
region of the Amazon rainforest. The Peruvian government developed a 
counterproposal to the US’s strictly military strategy that became known 
as the  Fujimori Doctrine . Underlying the Peruvian proposal was the 
idea  that  coca  cultivation  was  not  criminal  in  nature,  but  a  result  of 
poverty, and the proposed solution was alternative development (AD). 
The Fujimori Doctrine decriminalized coca cultivation, diminishing farmers 
need for protection from terrorists and making it easier to fight violent 
groups (Obando 2006). 8_
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4 2    Coca commerciali ation channels
In general, almost all the coca from registered and non-registered 
coca farmers supplies cocaine traffic. The distribution of Peruvian coca 
production in 2004 reveals that the total dried coca-leaf production was 
109,936  metric  tons,  of  which  FONANPE  (2005)  estimated  that  the 
traditional use demand was 8,990 metric tons (8.2   of the total coca 
production). In addition, around 200 metric tons of coca (0.2   of the 
total coca production) was attributed to industrial uses (e. g., coca tea 
bags and similar). So, the remaining national coca production (91.6  ) is 
allegedly supplying cocaine traffic (figure 1).
 igure 1
Coca-Leaf Commercialization Channels.
n.d.: non determined.
     Inactive registered coca growers are the coca-leaf producers who did not sell coca leaf 
to ENACO during the period 2001-2004.
    It includes 200 MT derived to industrial uses.
Source: Adapted from FONANPE (2005).
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The traditional market represents a small share of the total coca 
market (8.2  ), and it is further divided into informal and formal sub-
markets. Coca from registered farmers commercialized through ENACO 
constitutes  the  traditional  formal  market  (32    of  the  total  traditional 
market). Coca from registered or non registered farmers commercialized 
outside ENACO channels, comprises the traditional informal market (the 
remaining 68   of the total traditional market). Farmers who do not want 
to supply cocaine traffic have to decide to commercialize their production 
between the informal market and ENACO. Most farmers prefer selling 
coca on the informal sub-market where the prices are higher and often 
their product is also collected directly from their plots, which allow them 
saving  transportation  costs.  Moreover,  the  informal  market  has  a _  
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differentiated price policy during the year, with much higher prices during 
the season when coca production is low. In contrast, ENACO pays a 
fixed low price all year round (Glave and Rosemberg 2005). The informal 
traditional market has been largely tolerated, and informal traders are 
also rarely prosecuted by the government (Durand 2005).
  
Current Drug Control Policy Implementation 
and Evaluation
Current drug-control efforts have tried to eliminate coca cultivation 
through different strategies. Two general types of drug-control policies 
are implemented in Peru: eradication and AD. The former treats coca 
cultivation as an international conventions enforcement issue and calls 
for  direct  eradication,  with  immediate  results;  the  latter  treats  coca 
cultivation as a poverty issue and prioritizes poverty reduction, with long-
term results (Commission on Narcotic Drugs 2005).
  1   Eradication Policies
There are two types of eradication programs: a) manual eradication; 
and b) chemical control that involves spraying a herbicide  glyphosate  
from low-flying aircraft over coca cultivation fields ( eillette and Navarrete-
Frías  2005).  The  Peruvian  law:  Prohibition  on  the  Eradication  Using 
Pesticides of 2000 (Supreme Decree No. 004-2000-AG) prohibits the use 
of  pesticides  or  related  substances  to  eradicate  coca  plantations,  in 
response to objections to chemical control from farmers. The government 
justified  the  prohibition  of  aerially  administered  herbicides  based  on 
environmental and public health criteria (ibid.).
Thus, only manual eradication is permitted in Peru. Manual eradication 
employs agricultural workers to physically uproot individual coca bushes; 
30  men  can  eradicate  1-2  hectares  of  coca  per  day.  Obando  (2006) 
indicates  that  at  this  rate  it  would  require  69  years  to  eradicate  the 
200,000 hectares of coca that existed during the 1980s, provided not one 
more hectare was planted in Peru. In addition, it was reported that some 
coca plantations eradicated manually were cut down and not uprooted, 
and  exhibited  invigorated  growth  afterwards  (Office  of  Technology 
Assessment 1993).
The eradication activities in Peru are believed to be associated with 
political  pressure  from  the  US,  which  for  example,  provides  95    of 
Peru’s AD funds, but disallows their use  unlinked  to eradication. The 
Peruvian government is required to implement eradication activities to 
access AD resources. European donors place no such restrictions on 
development funds (Commission on Narcotic Drugs 2005).7 _
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  2   AD Policies
There is no universally accepted definition of AD. The UN defines AD 
as the  process to prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of crops 
through  rural  development  measures  within  the  context  of  sustained 
national economic growth . The ultimate goal of AD is  to help shape a 
set  of  conditions  which,  given  sufficient  time  and  growth  of  the  licit 
economy, could lead to permanent behavioral change in drug producing 
areas. AD aims at creating conditions for those who give up growing illicit 
drug crops to participate in licit economic activities and hence permanently 
give up growing drugs  (UNODC 2005: viii).
AD has evolved as various approaches to supply reduction have 
been attempted. The evolution of AD strategic reasoning can be described 
as follows (UNODC, 2001, 2005 and 2009):
a)  Crop  substitution  phase:  At  the  beginning  of  the  1970s,  the 
international community supported crop substitution projects. The idea 
behind those projects was to directly replace illicit crops with alternative 
legal crops. After many failures it became clear that the economics of 
crop substitution required additional measures to tackle the underlying 
economic,  environmental,  and  social  problems  that  support  an  illicit 
economy and motivate farmers to continue to cultivate illicit drug crops. 
Those problems vary according to the specific source area and potential 
solutions  include  infrastructure  development,  education,  technical 
assistance,  enabling  social  mobility  and  empowerment,  and  other 
development efforts.
b)  Income substitution phase:  crop substitution  was subsequently 
replaced  by   income  substitution ,  as  a  broader  and  more  realistic 
approach, which tended to seek alternative ways of providing a livelihood 
for farmers without assuming that legal crops can replace illegal crop 
profits. This approach includes a combined implementation of different 
alternatives  such  as  promoting  non-agricultural  opportunities  and 
enhancing  alternative  crop  profits  with  certification  schemes,  among 
others.
c)  Integrated rural development (IR ) phase: the IRD approach was 
adopted in the 1980s. IRD simultaneously addressed a broad range of 
local social, economic, and environmental problems. The approach is 
expensive,  generally  requiring  large  international  staff  and  a  large 
complement of local counterparts.
d)   ainstream development phase: It is considered  a more cost-
cognizant approach  to AD. The best alternatives from a list of possible 
interventions obtained from a holistic evaluation of the local situation are 
chosen in order to limit funding requirements and to use available skills 
most effectively. This approach also seeks to embed anti-drug activities 
within regional and national level development programs. UNODC has 
nominally  endorsed  this  approach  for  its  alternative  development _71
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interventions, but in practice their efforts continue to resemble the earlier 
IRD approach.
In Peru, efforts to deal with the drug problem centered on eradication 
and interdiction until about 1990, when focus shifted to AD. On a global 
basis, farmers receiving AD assistance have been relatively few due to 
budget constraints. AD projects have worked with only 23   and 5   of 
the families in coca and poppy cultivation areas, respectively (Commission 
on Narcotic Drugs 2005, INCB 2009).
Experts emphasize the importance of combined eradication and AD 
strategies. Eradication only works in reducing coca areas when preceded 
by comprehensive development programs to promote alternative, licit 
livelihoods. Where such alternatives exist, farmers who persist with coca 
cultivation can be pushed by eradication towards legal livelihoods. Where 
alternatives do not exist, eradication can fuel violence and insecurity, 
hostility to national authorities, displace cultivation to less accessible 
locations,  and  ultimately  undermine  long-term  efforts  to  change  the 
conditions that promote drug crop cultivation (Mansfield 2006).
  3   Are current drug control policies effective 
From  the  point  of  view  of  international  donors,  the  objective  of 
eradication policies is to reduce drug availability. If farmers eliminate their 
coca crops, the supply of cocaine should become limited and cocaine 
prices would rise in demand countries. According to economic theory, 
the  direct  consequence  of  prices  going  up  would  be  a  reduction  in 
cocaine demand (Walsh 2009).
 igure 2
Price per Pure Gram of Cocaine at Retail Level in the U.S. (1981-2011).
Source: U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy (2012). Own elaboration.
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Following  Caulkins  et  al.  (2005),  one  evaluation  method  of  drug-
control  policies  would  be  to  analyze  the  trends  in  cocaine  prices  in 
demand countries. A reduction in cocaine availability could be inferred 
from large increases in retail prices. In the case of the US, analysis of 
prices over a 27-year period (1981-2007) indicates that despite aggressive 
and costly activities aimed at reducing cocaine supply; the cocaine prices 
have decreased and the quality (purity) has remained relatively stable 
(see figures 2 and 3).
In  addition,  the  highly  skewed  cocaine  equivalent  prices  in  the 
distribution system (see table 2) creates a situation in which consumer 
prices might increase only 0.5   (from US 120,000 to US 120,650 per 
pure kilogram equivalent) even if eradication activities were successful 
and  farm-gate  prices  were  doubled  (from  US 650  to  1300  per  pure 
kilogram equivalent) (ibid.). Therefore, Kennedy et al. (1994: xii) indicate 
that the justification for U.S. funded eradication efforts  … has to be 
found in claims other than (to) reduce U.S. cocaine consumption in the 
long run .
Eradication policies seem to affect neither the quantities of cocaine 
demanded nor in the quantities supplied overall. As indicated before, 
eradication  interventions  seem  to  only  be  affecting  where  drugs  are 
produced by shifting the location of coca cultivation within the Andean 
region (EU 2009). Rouse and Arce (2005) assessed the empirical effects 
of U.S. military assistance on coca cultivation in the Andes region, while 
controlling for other explanatory variables that influence coca cultivation. 
Using  data  from  1980-2001  for  Colombia,  Bolivia,  and  Peru,  they 
 igure 3
Purity of Cocaine at Retail Level in the U.S. (1981-2011).
Source: U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy (2012). Own elaboration.
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performed  a  pooled  cross-sectional  time-series  analysis.  Eradication 
operations  were  only  relatively  successful  in   squeezing  out   coca 
production in Bolivia and Peru, but the drug industry gravitated towards 
Colombia.  Continued  eradication  pressure  may  succeed  in  shifting 
production to other countries, such as Ecuador,  enezuela and/or Brazil. 
Concerning  this  issue,  coordinating  drug-control  policies  with  other 
governments may help to prevent the further expansion of coca production 
to other countries ( lvarez 1995).
On the contrary to eradication policies, (well-implemented) AD seems 
to have contributed to the reduction and containment of coca cultivation 
in supply countries (Commission on Narcotic Drugs 2005). Importantly, in 
contrast to eradication policies, AD projects have also achieved socio-
economic  improvements  in  specific  coca-growing  areas  where 
conventional  development  agencies  are  often  inactive,  despite  the 
prevailing levels of poverty (Mansfield 2006). Tabares and Rosales (2005) 
studied the effects of AD and eradication simultaneously, using municipal 
data for the period of 1998-2002 in Colombia. The results show that the 
investment in AD has a small effect, although statistically significant in 
the reduction of coca areas. According to their calculations, an increase 
of US 1,000 in AD project funding reduces coca cultivation areas by 
0.169 hectares of coca. In contrast, an increase of US  1,000 in the 
funding of eradication efforts reduces coca cultivation areas by 0.128 
hectares. This later result was no statistically significant.
  
Traditional uses and social control 
as supply side harm reduction strategies
There is a growing recognition that current drug-control policies; in 
particular, eradication based supply-side strategies aimed at eliminating 
coca production have failed (Nosyk and Wood 2012). I made a mistake 
about  this  reference.  It  is  not  Nosyk  and  Wood  but  (Commission  on 
Narcotics Drugs, 2005). So, innovative approaches, such as supply-side 
harm reduction, may help to curbe the coca cultivation problem. Farthing 
Stage Price   S   Place
Farm-gate 650 Leaf in Colombia
Export 1 000 Colombia
Import 15 000-20 000 Miami
Wholesale (Kilogram) 33 000 Chicago
Retail (100 mg pure) 120 000 Chicago
Source: Adapted from EU (2009).
Table 2
Prices of Cocaine through the Distribution System (per pure kg equivalent)74_
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and Kohl (2012) argue that this type of strategy has been implemented in 
Bolivia, and focuses on prioritizing the reduction of police and military-
driven violence, ensuring a subsistence income for coca growers, while 
maintaining a high price for coca leaf. Therefore, it also seeks to limit 
coca cultivation indirectly by reducing the quantity of coca that ends up 
as cocaine. The scheme incorporates AD policies. However, the reduction 
of cocaine traffic is supposed to be achieved based on a community 
social control. Under this context,  social control refers to the types and 
sources of societal pressure that compel people to conform to established 
and  generally  accepted  norms   (Farthing  and  Kohl  2012:  490). 
Nevertheless,  the  authors  argue  that  the  program’s  impact  on  coca 
cultivation is difficult to measure. In the Yungas, coca cultivation has 
declined  by  2  ,  while  in  the  Chapare  region,  coca  cultivation  has 
increased by 4  . It is difficult to attribute causality to the implementation 
of  supply-side  harm  reduction  strategies  to  those  changes  because 
specific external factors could have also influenced the final outcome (e. 
g., local changes in coca prices, trade and distribution systems).
According to Hirschi (1969), social control is based on four elements: 
attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief. As such, attachment 
can be translated to the emotional connection among members of the 
community (e. g., Aymara identity, chewing coca leaves, and sharing 
coca with other members of the community); commitment to the loss of 
social esteem connected to nonconformity (e. g., participation or not in 
 Minka  or mandatory communal activities); involvement to participation 
to a conventional and legitimate activity (e. g., being catholic or being 
coffee farmer); and belief to the conventional belief in societal norms (e. 
g., considering that coca growing is harmful for the community or society). 
This theory has achieved popularity as an explanation for delinquency 
(Kempf  and  Decker  1994).  Nevertheless,  there  are  few  data  studies 
related to the effects of social control on the scale of cultivation of illegal 
crops.  One  exception  is  Hammersvik  et  al.  (2012),  who  conducted 
qualitative  interviews  with  Cannabis  growers.  They  found  that  social 
control aspects, such as the association of low-scale growing with anti-
commercialism, anti-violence, and ecological and community values, are 
major factors that limit low scale growers to become large scale growers 
in Norway.
To  date,  supply-side  harm  reduction  strategies  based  on  social 
control  have  neither  been  explicitly  evaluated  nor  applied  in  Peru. 
Moreover, there is an emerging momentum and enthusiasm towards the 
reform of drug-control policies influenced by evidence as opposed to 
philosophical ideals (Nosyk and Wood 2012). As such, any proposed 
supply-side harm reduction strategies need to be supported by evidence. 
Nevertheless, even the UN, which administers the international drug-
control regime, has difficulties by finding evidence of drug-control policy 
achievements (Greenfield and Paoli 2012). In this paper, a unique data set 
from an indigenous community is analyzed in order to evaluate if supply-
side harm reduction based on social control strategies could be effective 
in countries such as Peru. The data were collected from San Pedro de 
Putina Punco (SPPP), located in the upper Tambopata river basin in the _7 
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department  of  Puno  at  Bolivian  border,  one  of  the  most  remote  and 
inaccessible rainforest areas in Amazonian Peru (UNODC Office in Peru 
1999). Coca produced in the upper Tambopata river basin supplies cross-
border cocaine trafficking associations between Peru and Bolivia. Bolivia 
is a significant transportation route for cocaine of Peruvian origin (US 
Department of State, 2009). From Bolivia the cocaine is dispatched to 
Brazil and Europe (Garcia and Antezana 2009).
To collect these data, a feasibility study was first conducted to test if 
farmers would answer coca-related questions. Then a final survey4 took 
place from June to August 2008. This final survey consisted of a structured 
questionnaire,  which  focused  on  agricultural  production  and  social 
capital.  The  questionnaire  included  the  following  topics:  general 
information about farmers, agricultural plot characteristics, additional off-
farm economic activities, cognitive social capital and identity, personal 
aspirations and risk attitudes, structural social capital, human capital, 
coca cultivation and coca use traditions, and other questions.
All the farmers in this region were coffee growers, and some of them 
also cultivated coca as a secondary crop. Farmers had to be a member 
of one of a co-operative to be able to sell their coffee, because restrictions 
to coffee intermediaries were in place at the time of the survey conduction. 
A total of 496 valid questionnaires were collected. The total number of 
coffee co-operative members was 3265 in 2008. Therefore, the percentage 
of co-operative member interviewed was 15  . A convenience sampling 
method was applied, but at the end of the survey, the farmers were 
requested  to  report  their  cooperative  registration  number.  The  co-
operative registration number provided by the farmers was written on 
separate  piece  of  paper  and  was  not  attached  to  the  respondent’s 
questionnaire.  A  comparison  between  our  sample  and  a  simulated 
random  sample  without  replacement  indicated  that  the  sample  was 
equivalent to a simple random sample and therefore representative of the 
population under study. The survey response rate was about 90  .
Coca  growers  constituted  64    of  the  sample.  They  reported 
cultivating an average of 3093 coca bushes, which would be the equivalent 
of 0.1 hectares, given a conventional coca growing density of around 
35,000 bushes per hectare (UNODC 2001). This average coca area is 
within the range found in  RAE ( alle del Río Apurimac y  ne), one of the 
main  coca  growing  regions  in  Peru,  where  most  of  the  farmers  self-
reported that coca areas are between 0.1 to 0.5 hectares (Rodríguez 
2003). SPPP is a relatively new coca growing area for narcotic traffic 
(UNODC Office in Peru, 1999), and it is expected that some farmers are 
only growing coca for traditional self-consumption.
Basic comparative information between coca and non-coca growers 
using  data  from  the  survey  is  presented  in  table  3.  There  were  no 
statistically significant differences with respect to general socio-economic 
characteristics (age, sex, ethnic group, number of children and years of 
education) between coca and non-coca growers at the 0.05 significance 
level.  Therefore  the  two  groups  are  similar  in  relation  to  those 
characteristics.
4	 The	survey	conduction	and	
descriptive	statistics	are	
detailed	in	 arcia  i	and	 rote	
(2012).	 nly	a	summary	of	the	
survey	conduction	is	provided	
in	this	paper.7 _
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Coca 
growers
Non coca 
growers
Age 42.5
(12.7)
41.7
(12.5)
Male (  ) 93.9 94.9
Aymara ( ) 81.4 82.5
Number of children 3.0
(2.0)
2.9
(2.1)
Years of education 8.2
(3.3)
8.7
(3.3)
Total areas (Ha) 7.9
(8.4)
8.0
(7.8)
Number of coca bushes 3093
(6710) -
Standard deviations are in parentheses for continuous variables.
Source: Garcia-Yi and Grote (2012).
Table 3
Comparative description between coca and non-coca growers.
Percentage
of the total
farmers
Decision to grow 
coca  tetrachoric 
correlation 
coefficients 
Attachment
Aymara identity 0.82 -0.0266
(0.0848)
Chewing coca leaves 0.68 0.3735   
(0.0673)
Sharing coca with other members of the 
community 0.78 0.4569   
(0.0678)
Commitment
Participation in communal activities 0.89 0.2322  
(0.0923)
Involvement
Being Catholic 0.58 0.0352
(0.0731)
Proud of being coffee farmer 0.66 0.1033
(0.0745)
Beliefs
Considering that coca growing is harmful for 
the community 0.48 -0.2212   
(0.0701)
Considering that coca growing is harmful for 
the overall society 0.51 -0.2743   
(0.0700)
Standard errors in parentheses.     Significant at 0.01.
Table 4
Relationship between the decision to grow coca and social control variables.
The specific relationship between coca growing decisions and social 
control variables are explored in two stages: as tetrachoric correlation 
between the decision to grow coca or not and social control variables 
(two dichotomous variables), and as point biserial correlation between 
the scale of coca cultivation and social control variables (one dichotomous 
and one continuous variable). Table 4 shows the results of the (tetrachoric) 
correlation coefficients between the decision to grow coca or not, and 
social control variables._77
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As expected, there is a significant positive correlation between some 
attachment variables related to traditional coca uses with the decision to 
cultivate coca. Those variables include coca chewing and sharing coca 
leaves with other members of the community. Commitment, measured as 
participation  in  communal  activities,  is  also  statistically  significantly 
correlated with the decision to grow coca. On the other hand, beliefs 
such as considering that coca growing is harmful for the community and 
overall society are negatively correlated with the decision to grow coca.
Table  5  presents  the  results  of  the  (point  biserial)  correlation 
coefficients  between  the  scale  of  coca  cultivation  and  social  control 
variables, conditional on growing coca. This means that only the sub-set 
of farmers who grow coca are used in this analysis.
Average number
of coca bushes
Sample
si e
Correlation
point biserial
coefficients
Attachment
Aymara identity
Yes 2472 253 -0.1960   
(3.5117) No 5851   58
Chewing coca leaves
Yes 3094 237 0.0002
(-0.0088) No 3087   75
Sharing coca with other 
members of the community
Yes 2869 270 -0.0846 
(1.4952) No 4532   42
Commitment
Participation in communal 
activities
Yes 3193 287 0.0510
(-0.8917) No 1943   25
Involvement
Being Catholic
Yes 2485 185 -0.1093  
(1.9365) No 3978 127
Proud of being coffee farmer
Yes 2612 210 -0.1054  
(1.8631) No 4124 102
Beliefs
Considering that coca 
growing is harmful for the 
community
Yes 2055 130 -0.1366  
(2.4118) No 3920 178
Considering that coca 
growing is harmful for the 
overall society
Yes 2120 169 -0.1276  
(2.2285) No 3856 133
t-values in parentheses. Significant at:  0.1,   0.05,     0.01.
Table  
Relationship between the scale of coca growing and
social control variables, conditional on growing coca
Almost all of the social control variables show a statistically significant 
negative  correlation  with  the  scale  of  coca  growing.  Those  variables 
include Attachment factors, such as Aymara identity and sharing coca 
leaves with other members of the community; Involvement factors, such 
as being Catholic and proud of being a coffee farmer; and Beliefs, such 
as considering that coca growing is harmful for the community and the 
overall society.78_
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Summary and conclusions
The analysis of the information indicates that: 1) traditional uses of 
coca  are  widespread  in  Peru;  2)  the  validity  of  coca  chewing  as  a 
constructive  symbol  of  indigenous  population,  based  on  historical 
evidence, has been challenged; 3) international conventions ratified by 
Peru ban coca cultivation, although they are still vague with respect to 
traditional uses; 4) coca cultivation is banned according to the national 
legislation, nevertheless, a void in the law gives rise to the interpretation 
that some farmers have inherited the rights to continue cultivating coca 
for traditional use; 5) coca growing is not punishable under the Criminal 
Code in Peru; 6) coca commercialization outside ENACO channels is 
indeed forbidden by law; however, the government does not persecute 
informal traditional use traders; 7) eradication policies alone are largely 
ineffective in reducing coca growing areas; and 8) innovative drug-control 
policies and legislative reforms are necessary Peru, although they have 
not taken place to date.
Possible innovative drug-control policies that could be considered as 
one  of  the  foundations  of  a  legislative  reform  are  supply-side  harm 
reduction  strategies.  Those  strategies,  based  on  social  control,  have 
been implemented in Bolivia, although their effects on coca growing are 
still unclear. This paper explores the possible effects of social control 
variables (attachment, commitment, involvement, and beliefs) on coca 
growing decisions in Peru. The evaluation is based on correlations, given 
that the direction of causality between those variables cannot be clearly 
determined  in  some  cases  a  priori  (for  example,  farmers  may  have 
decided to grow coca because they actually chew coca; or farmers who 
already have coca may have decided to start chewing coca because it is 
now  easily  available   although  the  latter  case  is  less  likely ). 
Nevertheless, the data seem to provide evidence that even though some 
social control variables (e.g. sharing coca with other members of the 
community) and the decision to grow coca are positively associated; 
social control could counteract this effect by favoring the even more 
important effect of limiting the scale of coca cultivation. So, the available 
evidence  does  not  seem  to  support  the  fear  from  international 
organizations that e. g. traditional uses could positively influence the 
scale of coca cultivation, although the results need to be considered with 
caution,  and  more  research  is  needed  to  clarify  this  effect  (e.g.  by 
correcting for potential selectivity bias in future studies).
Finally, it is important to mention that supply-side harm reduction 
strategies, based on social control, should not be seen as a  magic 
bullet  that can solve all coca-growing related problems. However, they 
could ideally help to reduce exclusion, polarization, and violence in coca 
growing areas. Those strategies should be evaluated in different coca 
growing regions individually, given that coca growers are heterogeneous, _7 
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and important differences could be associated to those farmers’ specific 
backgrounds and geographical locations. Furthermore, there are limits to 
what supply countries such as Peru can actually do to combat cocaine 
traffic, if there is continued demand. Supply and demand countries, e. g., 
North America and Europe, need to cooperate in comprehensive but 
coherent measures, including conjoint drug-control policies that are also 
framed according to the realities of countries with millenarian traditional 
coca uses.
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FIGURES
Figure 1: Coca-Leaf Commercialization Channels
n.d.: non determined.
  Inactive registered coca growers are the coca-leaf producers who did not sell coca leaf 
to ENACO during the period 2001-2004.
   It includes 200 MT derived to industrial uses.
Source: Adapted from FONANPE (2005).
Figure 2: Price per Pure Gram of Cocaine at Retail Level in the U.S. (1981-2011)
Source: U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy (2012). Own elaboration.
Figure 3: Purity of Cocaine at Retail Level in the U.S. (1981-2011)
Source: U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy (2012). Own elaboration.
 